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The probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are conventionally obtained
from a special probabilistic axiom. But that is unnecessary because all the
practical consequences of such predictions follow from the remaining, non-
probabilistic, axioms of quantum theory, together with the non-probabilistic
part of classical decision theory.
Introduction
Suppose that a quantum system S has density operator ö r at the instant when an
observable ö X of S is to be accurately measured. The outcome of the measurement
must be one of the eigenvalues of ö X, but quantum theory does not in general specify
which. Instead, in conventional formulations of the theory (see e.g. dÕEspagnat
(1976), Cohen-Tannoudji et al. (1978)), a statement such as the following is taken as
axiomatic:
The probability that the outcome will be x is Tr ö P x ö r,
where ö P x is the projection operator into the space of all
eigenvalue-x eigenstates of ö X.
(1)
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We shall be concerned mainly with measurements of a non-degenerate observable ö X
in a pure state y  of S, in which case the expression for the probability reduces to
x y
2
. I shall in effect prove the probabilistic axiom (1) from the non-probabilistic
axioms of quantum theory. The proviso Ôin effectÕ is necessary only because in the
conventional formulation the meaning of probability statements is left undefined,
while I shall obtain it from the theory. Previous attempts to do this (e.g. Everett
(1957), Finkelstein (1963), Hartle (1968), DeWitt and Graham (1973), Ohkuwa (1993))
applied only to infinite sets of measurements (which do not occur in nature), and not
to the outcomes of individual measurements (which do). My method is to analyse
the behaviour of a rational decision maker who is faced with decisions involving the
outcomes of future quantum-mechanical measurements. I shall prove that if he does
not assume (1), or any other probabilistic postulate, but does believe the rest of
quantum theory, he necessarily makes decisions as if (1) were true. I take the latter to
be the effective meaning of (1).
The decision maker is rational in the standard decision-theoretic sense (see e.g. Luce
and Raiffa (1957)), except that, to avoid circularity, we must omit from the definition
of ÔrationalityÕ anything that refers directly or indirectly to probabilities. In particular
we must not make the standard assumption that a rational decision maker
maximises the expectation value of his utility. In this approach, such propositions
are to be proved rather than postulated. ÔRationalityÕ in this restricted sense means
conformity to a set of constraints on a decision makerÕs preferences. For example, his
preferences must be transitive: if he prefers A to B, and B to C, then he must also
prefer A to C. Transitive preferences can be summarised by assigning a real number
Ð a utility or value Ð to each possible outcome, in such a way that the decision maker
prefers higher-valued outcomes to lower-valued ones.
In classical physics, in situations of perfect knowledge (where one knows all the
variables that can affect the outcome, and can calculate how they affect it), the
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behaviour of a rational decision maker is, up to degeneracy, fully determined by his
preferences among the possible outcomes. He chooses one of the options which, he
calculates, will cause the highest-valued outcome. In quantum physics, there may
not be any Ôoption which causes the highest-valued outcomeÕ, because choosing a
given option will in general make possible a range of outcomes, and not even perfect
knowledge of the circumstances will allow one to predict which of those one will
observe. That is where probability is conventionally introduced, in the form of a
probabilistic physical axiom such as (1). I shall show that this is unnecessary.
My assumption that the non-probabilistic part of standard decision theory is
applicable in a quantum world is a substantive one. It is not self-evident that rational
decision making does not have a radically different character, or that rationality is
possible at all, in the presence of quantum-mechanical processes Ð or, for that matter,
in the presence of electromagnetic or any other processes. Nor could any analysis
from within physics ever decide what is rational, or what is within the scope of
reason. But that is not what I am about here. My objective is to prove something that
is conventionally taken as axiomatic (the probabilistic axiom of quantum theory)
from other things that are conventionally taken as axiomatic but do not refer to
probability, namely quantum theory and decision theory, both stripped of their
probabilistic axioms.
Deriving a Ôtends toÕ from a ÔdoesÕ
In cases where quantum theory predicts that a measurement will have a particular
outcome, that outcome can, in the conventional formulation, be said to Ôhave
probability 1Õ. Our decision maker would not put it that way because he does not
know what ÔprobabilityÕ means. He would simply predict that that outcome Ôwill
happenÕ because he knows, from the non-probabilistic part of quantum theory, that
if ö X is measured in any of its eigenstates x , the outcome will be the corresponding
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eigenvalue x. From this he can make a further non-probabilistic prediction, namely
that if ö X is measured when S is in an arbitrary pure state y , the outcome x will be
in the set x x y ¹ 0{ } . To prove this, suppose that the decision maker has made an
accurate, non-perturbing measurement of ö X using an apparatus A, and that he then
measures whether the outcome was indeed in the set x x y ¹ 0{ } . He can do this by
measuring the observable
ö P = A x( ) A x( )
x x y ¹0{ }
å , (2)
on A, where A x( )  is the state in which the apparatus has recorded an outcome x for
the first measurement. He does not need any probabilistic axiom to predict the
outcome of this second measurement: it must be 1, because A is in an eigenstate of ö P
with eigenvalue 1.
In themselves, predictions of this type are of little practical use, since to identify the
set x x y ¹ 0{ }  one needs to know the state y  with infinite accuracy, which is
presumably impossible. Moreover, in the expansions of realistic states there are vast
numbers of very small non-vanishing components x y x , so identifying the set of
possible outcomes is not usually very informative. That is why we need what a
probabilistic axiom such as (1) conventionally provides, namely a rationale for
practical prediction, expectation and decision making in the case of general y  (or
ö r). We need, for instance, to show that if one of the quantities x y
2
 is
overwhelmingly larger than the sum of the others, then it is safe to rely on the
corresponding eigenvalue x being the outcome of the measurement even though it is
possible that it will not be; and that if x1 y
2
 and x2 y
2
 are equal, it is fair to bet at
equal odds on the outcome being x1 or x2 ; and so on. But we need to show all this
without assuming any probabilistic axiom.
Let our decision maker become a player in a simple game in which he knows in
advance that S is to be prepared in a given pure state y , that an observable ö X of S
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is to be measured, and that he will receive a payoff that depends only on the
outcome of the measurement. For convenience, let us consider games in which the
measured value of ö X is numerically equal to the utility of the payoff, measured on
some suitable utility scale. And let us consider only players for whom the utilities of
the possible payoffs can be assigned so as to have an additivity property, namely
that the player is indifferent between receiving two separate payoffs with utilities x1
and x2 , and receiving a single payoff with utility x1 + x2 . Heuristically we may think
of S as a randomising device that displays how much money the player is to be
paid, but this is only an approximation because amounts of money will not in
general satisfy the additivity condition strictly. The amount of money required to
give the player a particular utility x will be a non-linear function of x, and will also
vary according to the costs and rewards associated with receiving the money under
different circumstances.
The value of a game to the player is defined as the utility of a hypothetical payoff such
that the player is indifferent between playing the game and receiving that payoff
unconditionally. Heuristically it is the least upper bound on amounts of money that
the player would be willing to pay for the privilege of playing the game. One of the
non-probabilistic axioms of decision theory, the principle of substitutibility, constrains
the values of composite games (games that involve the playing of sub-games). It says
that if any of the sub-games is replaced by a game of equal value, then to a rational
player, the value of the composite game is unchanged. This really means that if the
value of a sub-game depends on the circumstances under which it is played, then
there is a way of reinterpreting those circumstances as additional payoffs or
conditions of the game, in such a way that the principle of substitutibility will hold Ð
at least for a class of games including those we are considering. Like all the decision-
theoretic principles we are applying, this is a substantive assumption, but it is not a
probabilistic assumption.
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The only other axiom we shall need from decision theory concerns two-player, zero-
sum games. Heuristically, these are games in which the only payoffs consist of money
changing hands between two players. In our case they are games in which there are
two possible roles Ð say, A and B Ð for a player, with the following property:
whenever a player would receive a payoff x if he were playing in role A, he would
receive -x  if he were playing in role B. It is a theorem of classical decision theory
that if VA  and VB  are the respective values of playing such a game in roles A and B,
VA +VB = 0 . (3)
In classical, probabilistic decision theory, (3) follows from the fact that if the sum of a
set of stochastic variables is zero, then the sum of their expectation values is also
zero. In classical, non-probabilistic decision theory it is trivially true, since each game
can have only one payoff, which is equal to the value of the game. Now, since (3) is
merely a constraint on the values of various games, and does not relate those values
to any probabilities, we may take it as an axiom of our stripped-down, non-
probabilistic version of decision theory. Let us call it the zero-sum rule.
That games involving quantum measurements have values in the above sense is not
an independent assumption, but follows from the assumptions I have already made:
On being offered the opportunity to play such a game at a given price, knowing y ,
our player will respond somehow: he will either accept or refuse. His acceptance or
refusal will follow a strategy which, given that he is rational, must be expressible in
terms of transitive preferences and therefore in terms of a value V y[ ] for each
possible game. V y[ ] is the value of playing our game with S in the state y  Ð so a
rational decision maker who is given the choice between playing our game with S in
the state y1  or y 2 , where V y1[ ] >V y 2[ ], will invariably choose y1 .
I shall prove that
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V y[ ] = y ö X y , (4)
and since
y ö X y = xa y
2
x a
a
å , (5)
where the sum is over a complete set xa  of eigenstates of ö X, it will follow that in
making decisions about the outcomes of measurements, a rational decision maker
behaves as if he believed that each possible outcome xa  had a probability, given by
the conventional formula xa y
2
, and as if he were maximising the probabilistic
expectation value of the payoff.
This result, which as I said, I take to be the meaning of (1), will also justify what is
strictly speaking only an assumption at this stage, namely that the laws of quantum
mechanics are consistent with the existence of decision makers whose preferences
have the attributes stated above.
I have already noted that in cases where y  is any eigenstate x  of ö X, no
probabilistic assumption is needed to predict the outcome of a measurement of ö X: it
must be x. Hence
V x[ ] = x , (6)
which is indeed a special case of (4).
The next simplest of these games are those in which y  is an equal-amplitude
superposition of two eigenstates of ö X:
y =
1
2
x1 + x 2( ) . (7)
To conform to (4), we have to show that the value of such games is 12 x1 + x2( ) .
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Note that
V l a xa + k
a
å
é 
ë 
ê 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
ú 
= k+ V la xa
a
å
é 
ë 
ê 
ê 
ù
û
ú
ú
, (8)
where the sums are over all eigenvalues of ö X, the la{ } are arbitrary amplitudes and
k is an arbitrary constant. This is proved by appealing twice to the additivity of
utilities. First, receiving any of the possible payoffs xa + k  of the game referred to on
the left of (8) has, by additivity, the same utility as receiving the payoff xa  followed
by the payoff k. But that sequence of events is physically identical to (and so must
have the same utility as) playing the game with S in the state referred to on the right
of (8) and then receiving a payoff k, so by additivity again, (8) holds.
It follows from the zero-sum rule (3) that the value of the game of acting as ÔbankerÕ
in one of these games (i.e. receiving a payoff -xa  when the outcome of the
measurement is xa ) is the negative of the value of the original game. In other words
V l a xa
a
å
é 
ë 
ê 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
ú 
+V la -xa
a
å
é 
ë 
ê 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
ú 
= 0. (9)
From (8), with k = -x1- x2 , and (9), we have
-V 1
2
x2 + x1( )[ ] = -x1 - x2 + V 12 x1 + x2( )[ ] , (10)
i.e.
V 1
2
x1 + x 2( )[ ] = 12 x1 + x2( ) , (11)
as required.
In (11) we have determined the value of a game whose outcome is indeterminate.
That is the pivotal result of this paper. We shall see that the general result (4), and
therefore in effect the axiom (1), follow quite straightforwardly from it. Yet we have
derived it strictly from non-probabilistic quantum theory and non-probabilistic
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decision theory, starting with valuations x1 and x2  of determinate games. Thus we
see that quantum theory permits what philosophy would hitherto have regarded as
a formal impossibility, akin to Ôderiving an ought from an isÕ, namely deriving a
probability statement from a factual statement. This could be called deriving a Ôtends
toÕ from a ÔdoesÕ.
The general case
The next step towards proving (4) is to generalise (11) to equal-amplitude
superpositions of n eigenstates of ö X:
V 1n x1 + x2 +K+ x n( )é ë ê 
ù 
û ú =
1
n
x1+ x2 +K+xn( ) . (12)
The proof of (12) is by induction, in two stages. The first, covering only the cases
where n= 2m  for some integer m, is on ascending values of m, and the second is on
descending values of n to cover the remaining cases. The first follows immediately
from the principle of substitutibility on considering a game with two equal-
amplitude outcomes, each of which is replaced by a game with 2m-1 equal-amplitude
outcomes. For the second, note that if every possible outcome of a game has utility v
then the game itself has value v. This is a consequence of additivity, since playing
such a game amounts to performing a measurement whose outcome is ignored, and
then receiving a payoff v unconditionally. Hence, if y1  and y 2  are superpositions
of eigenstates of ö X chosen respectively from two non-intersecting sets of eigenstates,
and a and b are complex numbers, and V y1[ ] = V y 2[ ] = v , substitutibility implies
that
V
a y1 + b y 2
a
2
+ b
2
ë 
ê 
ê 
ê 
û 
ú 
ú 
ú 
= v . (13)
Setting
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y1 =
1
n -1
x1 + x2 +K+ xn-1( ) , y 2 = V y1[ ] ,
a = n- 1, b = 1,
ü
ý
ï
þ
ï
(14)
in (13), and assuming (12) as the inductive hypothesis, we have
1
n
x1 + x2 + K+xn-1+V y1[ ]( ) = V y1[ ], (15)
which is equivalent to (12) with n- 1 replacing n. The substitution (14) is valid only
if V y1[ ] is different from each of the eigenvalues x1Kxn -1, but this can always be
arranged by choosing a suitable eigenvalue to label as ÔxnÔ in (12).
Now we can generalise to a case with unequal amplitudes by showing that
V
m
n
x1 +
n - m
n
x2
é 
ë 
ê 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
ú =
mx1 + n- m( )x2
n
, (16)
where m and n are integers. One way of measuring ö X when playing the game
referred to in (16) is to place an auxiliary system T in one of the two states
1
m
ya
a =1
m
å or 1
n- m
ya
a=m+1
n
å , (17)
according as ö X takes the value x1 or x2  respectively, where the expansions are in
terms of eigenstates of an observable ö Y of T , and the n eigenvalues ya{ }  are all
distinct. If the operation on T is performed coherently, the joint state of S  and T
becomes
1
n
x1 ya
a =1
m
å + x2 ya
a =m+1
n
å
æ 
è 
ç ç 
ö
ø÷
. (18)
Then we measure ö Y. If the outcome is one of the ya{ }  for 1£ a £ m, we have
measured ö X to have the value x1. Otherwise we have measured it to have the value
x2 .
Let the ya{ }  be chosen to have the additional properties that
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ya =
a =1
m
å ya
a = m+1
n
å = 0 , (19)
and that the n values x1 + ya 1 £ a £ m( ){ } , x 2 + ya m< a £ n( ){ } are all distinct. Then the
player will be indifferent to playing a further game in which he receives the
measured value of ö Y, for (19) ensures that both versions of that game (played after
the first payoff was respectively x1 or x2) have value zero. In other words, the
composite game played with ö X and ö Y consecutively has the same value as the game
played with ö X alone. However, because of additivity the composite game also has
the same value as the game in which a single measurement is made of the observable
ö X Ä ö 1 + ö 1 Ä ö Y , and in terms of eigenstates of that observable, the state (18) is an equal-
amplitude superposition
1
n
x1 + ya
a =1
m
å + x2 + ya
a=m+1
n
å
æ 
è 
ç ç 
ö
ø
÷÷ . (20)
So according to (12) and (19) the value of the game is
1
n
x1 + ya( )
a=1
m
å + x2 + ya( )
a=m+1
n
å
é 
ë 
ê 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
ú =
mx1 + n- m( )x 2
n
, (21)
as required. By replacing the payoffs x1 or x2  by games with those values, one can
obtain an analogous result for any finite superposition
pa xa
a
å pa
a
å = 1
æ 
è 
ç ç 
ö
ø
÷÷ (22)
whose coefficients pa{ }  are non-negative square roots of rational numbers.
To remove the restriction that the pa{ }  be rational, consider yet another class of
games. In these, S undergoes some unitary evolution U after it is prepared in its
initial state y  but before ö X is measured. In other words the state evolves to U y ,
so the value of the transformed game is
VU y[ ] = V U y[ ]. (23)
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Now, if U transforms each eigenstate xa  of ö X appearing in the expansion of y  to
an eigenstate x ¢ a  with higher eigenvalue, then by additivity the value of the
transformed game exceeds that of the original game. The same is true if each xa
evolves into a superposition of higher-eigenvalue eigenstates, by additivity and
substitutibility, for the player will agree to a transformation that is guaranteed to
increase his payoff, albeit by an unknown amount.
Consider transformations U that evolve each eigenstate of ö X that appears in the
expansion of y  into a superposition of itself and higher-eigenvalue eigenstates.
Because of the denseness of the rational numbers in the reals, there exist arbitrarily
slight transformations which have that property and evolve y  into a form U y
such that the squares of all the coefficients in the expansion of U y  in eigenstates of
ö X are rational. Each game played with such a state U y  is at least as valuable as the
original game, and the values of such games have a lower bound
xa y
2
xa
a
å . (24)
Similarly, the values of transformed games where the squares of the coefficients in
the expansion of U y  are rational, and where the games are at most as valuable as
the original game, have (24) as their upper bound. It follows that (24) is the value of
the original game, as required.
To prove that (24) remains the value of the game if the coefficients xa y  are
arbitrary complex amplitudes, let f a{ } be a set of arbitrary phases. Since the unitary
evolution defined by
xa ® e
i f a xa , (25)
performed after the measurement of ö X, does not alter the payoff, the player is
indifferent as to whether it occurs or not. But the final state following such evolution
David Deutsch Quantum Theory of Probability and Decisions
13
is the same as it would have been if (25) had occurred before the measurement of ö X.
Consequently, by additivity and substitutibility, state transformations of the form
(25) do not affect the values of our games. That completes the proof of (4) for general
pure states y  of systems with finite-dimensional state spaces.
Generalising these results to cases where S is not in a pure state is trivial if S is part
of a larger system that is in a pure state, for then every measurement on S is also a
measurement on the larger system. Further generalisation to exotic situations in
which the universe as a whole may be in a mixed state (Hawking (1976), Deutsch
(1991)), is left as an exercise for the reader.
Conclusions
No probabilistic axiom is required in quantum theory. A decision maker who
believes only the non-probabilistic part of the theory, and is ÔrationalÕ in the sense
defined by a strictly non-probabilistic restriction of classical decision theory, will
make all decisions that depend on predicting the outcomes of measurements as if
those outcomes were determined by stochastic processes, with probabilities given by
axiom (1). (However, in other respects he will not behave as if he believed that
stochastic processes occur. For instance if asked whether they occur he will certainly
reply ÔnoÕ, because the non-probabilistic axioms of quantum theory require the state
to evolve in a continuous and deterministic way.)
Likewise, no probabilistic axiom is required in decision theory. Classical stochastic
processes do not occur in nature, so decision theory need not concern itself with
them. Where probabilities arise from quantum indeterminacy, we have proved that a
rational decision maker will maximise the expectation value of his utility. Where
numbers obeying the probability calculus arise in any other context, regarding them
as probabilities in the decision-theoretic sense needs to be independently justified.
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The usual probabilistic terminology of quantum theory is justifiable in the light of
the results of this paper, provided that one understands it all as referring ultimately
to the behaviour of rational decision makers. For instance, defining the expectation
value of an outcome in such terms does relate it to the common-sense notion of
ÔexpectationÕ. For suppose that a rational decision maker does indeed pay an amount
V y[ ] for the privilege of playing a game of that value. He is, prospectively,
indifferent to doing so. But subsequently, he will have received a payoff which may
or may not be V y[ ]. If it is not, then although he knew in advance that this could
happen, he will no longer be indifferent, for he will have made either a definite
profit or a definite loss on the transaction. This deviation from indifference is
brought about by his discovering that the actual payoff was respectively more or less
than his prior valuation. So V y[ ] is indeed the payoff that a rational player
ÔexpectsÕ to receive, in the sense that it is the one from which he benefits neither
more nor less than he has budgeted for. Of course in another sense he may well not
be expecting that outcome: for instance when V y[ ] is not an eigenvalue of ö X, he
knows that V y[ ] is not one of the possible payoffs of the game.
Similarly, an outcome may be said to be random if it is unpredictable, and if (as will
always be the case in quantum theory), enough information to calculate its
expectation value exists somewhere. The term probability itself can be defined in this
way, working backwards from expectation values, and that is the sense in which (1)
follows from non-probabilistic postulates. Thus predictions such as Ôthe probability
of outcome x is x y
2
Ô become implications of a purely factual theory, rather than
axioms whose physical meanings are undefined.
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